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Applied Art and Industrial Design: A
Suggested Approach to Copyright
in Useful Articles
Robert C. Denicola*
The word "copyright" evokes images of books, movies, or
sound recordings. Further reflection might yield visions of
paintings, photographs, or sculptural works. Few, however, as-
sociate copyright with belt buckles, table lamps, or pencil
sharpeners-yet to some unsettled extent, even these items
have their place in the copyright scheme.
Copyright law has reluctantly embraced a variety of works
embodied in utilitarian objects, while simultaneously purport-
ing to exclude the general province of industrial design. The
courts have concluded that a light bulb protruding from Michel-
angelo's David ought not render the statue unprotectiblej
while insisting that the overall design of modern street lights
lies beyond the scope of copyright protection.2 The grudging
inclusion of selected useful objects has led both Congress. and
the courts to seek a rationale that could stand fast against the
deluge of mass-produced industrial goods. Although the search
has not gone well, the decision to exclude the general appear-
ance of commercial products from copyright protection remains
unshaken.3 The result has been a patchwork of ad hoc deci-
sions, united only by their common references to statutory for-
mulations that do little more thafh restate the dilemma.
The legal status of commercial design, however, is only par-
tially fixed by copyright principles. Design patents4 long of-
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
2. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979).
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works"). 'The Committee has added language to the definition of 'picto-
rial, graphic, and sculptural works' in an effort to make clearer the distinction
between works of applied art protectable under the bill and industrial designs
not subject to copyright protection." HR. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54
(1976), reprinted in 1976, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659-5801 [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 1476].
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976).
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fered the possibility of protection for the ornamental design of
a useful product. Their integration into a general patent regime
directed primarily at mechanical rather than aesthetic innova-
tion, however, severely undermined their practical utility.5
Consequently, alternative proposals have become a congres-
sional fixture,6 spawning a raft of conflicting academic analy-
sis. 7 The failure to win more specialized protection has
encouraged efforts to assimilate design protection into the law
of copyright. Indeed, even passage of a sui generis design stat-
ute would do little to deflect attempts to secure the more ex-
pansive monopoly offered by copyright. 8
This Article examines the current status of useful articles
under the Copyright Act of 19769 and proposes an alternative
analysis of their copyrightability. Congress, borrowing heavily
from prior administrative and judicial formulations, has con-
structed an elaborate mechanism to differentiate protectible
"applied art" from unprotectible "industrial design." Thus, the
Act rejects both wholesale inclusion and exclusion of utilitarian
objects, leaving it to the courts to define and defend a middle
ground. Against the backdrop of Justice Holmes's admonition
to avoid judicial determinations of artistic merit or worth,o
5. See infra note 30.
6. See, e.g., S. 22, tit. I, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201-235, 122 CONG. REC.
3856-59 (1975), reprinted in S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-47 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as S. 22, tit. I1]. Counting unsuccessful design protection
bills has become a popular pastime. See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1218
nI (C.C.PJ.A 1981) (Rich, J., concurring) ("Records I made in the mid 50's show
that, beginning in 1914, some 45 bills were introduced .... ."); Dulin, Design
Protection: Walking the Pirate Plank4 12 Bum. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 321, 325
(1965) ("In the fifty years since 1914, 55 design protection bills have been intro-
duced ... ."); Note, Protection for the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72
HARv. LJ REv. 1520, 1520 (1959) ("to date more than thirty-five such bills have
been unsuccessfully introduced"); Comment, Trade Regulation: Legal Protec-
tion of Commercial Design, 1959 WIs. IL REv. 652, 662 ("During the period of
1914 to 1959, forty-eight bills were introduced .... "). "Since 1914, approxi-
mately seventy design protection bills have been introduced in Congress, none
of which has been enacted into law." Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800
n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denie4 440 U.S. 908 (1979). The list continues to
grow. See H.R. 20,97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT I. REP.
(CCH) 1 20,097 (1981).
7. The more recent articles are noted and summarized in CoPYRIGHT OF-
FICE, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DESIGN PROTECTION (Supp. 1976).
8. Recent design protection bills have carefully preserved the proprietor's
right to rely on the copyright alternative. See, e.g., H.R. 20, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 927 (1981), reprinted in 2 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) T 20,097 (1981); S. 22, tit.
II, supra note 6, § 227.
9. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)).
10. It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the
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however, few touchstones developed. Yet, a discriminating ap-
proach is both defensible and desirable. Industrial design dif-
fers in important respects from the traditional subject matters
of copyright, and presents a less compelling claim to the statu-
tory monopoly. But it is unwise, if not in fact impossible, to ex-
clude from the scope of copyright all works capable of serving
some useful purpose. The attempts of the Congress, the Copy-
right Office, and the courts to delimit the boundaries of copy-
right in useful articles have been only partially successful.
Their efforts have a transient quality conspicuous even in a le-
gal regime populated by concepts as ephemeral as "idea," "ex-
pression," and "creativity." A good portion of the difficulty
arises from the tendency to focus exclusively on the results of
the creative effort. This Article suggests that it is the process of
creation that distinguishes industrial design from applied art
and other forms of authorship traditionally recognized by copy-
right law.
L INITIAL ENCOUNTERS
The uneasy relationship between copyright and utilitarian
articles has its roots in a series of piecemeal additions to the
statutory subject matter. The constitutional provision authoriz-
ing federal copyright legislation, with its reference to "Authors"
and their "Writings," gives little hint of the scope of modern
copyright law." The initial exercise of the copyright power in
1790 was confined to maps, charts, and books.12 In 1802, cover-
age was extended to "prints."13 Musical compositions were
brought within the statutory framework in 1831,14 and photo-
one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation.
Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more
than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paint-
ings of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the
first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (Holmes,
J.). See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) ("Individual perception of the
beautiful is too varied a power to permit a narrow or rigid concept of art.").
11. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. See generally W. DERENBERG, THE MEANING
OF '"VRrrINGS" IN THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (Copyright Of-
fice Study No. 3, 1956), reprinted in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 43 (Copyright
Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed. 1963).
12. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1976)).
13. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (repealed 1813).
14. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).
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graphs followed in 1865.15 Not until 1870, when protection was
extended to "painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary, and of
models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine
arts,"16 did three-dimensional objects gain protection. The em-
phasis on "fine arts," however, served to maintain a respectable
distance between copyright and useful articles. Under the
Copyright Act of 1909,17 the immediate precursor of the current
statute, however, claims of copyright in utilitarian objects could
not be so easily dismissed.
Among the items eligible for copyright under the 1909 Act
were those specified in section 5(g): "Works of art; models or
designs for works of art."18 With the deletion of all reference to
the '"ine arts," a major barrier to copyright in the design of use-
ful objects apparently fell. No logic could demonstrate that
crystal wine glasses, pearl rings, or even handsome radio cabi-
nets were not "works of art." The Copyright Office,' 9 however,
quickly moved to exclude useful articles from the scope of
copyright by resurrecting the very distinction so recently aban-
doned by the Congress. In a 1910 regulation defining "works of
art," the Copyright Office restricted the newly established clas-
sification to "the so-called fine arts," expressly excluding
"[p]roductions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and
character."20
The "industrial arts," however, proved difficult to contain.
In 1917, the Copyright Office amended the regulation to permit
registration of "artistic drawings notwithstanding they may af-
terwards be utilized for articles of manufacture."2 1 By 1949, the
breach was significantly wider. 'T"his class includes published
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (repealed 1870).
16. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1916).
17. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1077 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1976)).
18. Id. § 5(g).
19. The Copyright Office, under the direction of the Register of Copyrights,
is responsible for all administrative functions and duties under the Copyright
Act. 17 U.S.C. § 701 (1976). The Register of Copyrights is authorized to estab-
lish regulations for the administration of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 702
(1976).
20. Works of Art. This term includes all works belonging fairly to the
so-called fine arts. (Paintings, drawings, and sculpture).
Productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and charac-
ter are not subject to copyright registration, even if artistically made or
ornamented. No copyright exists in toys, games, dolls, advertising, nov-
elties, instruments or tools of any kind, glassware, embroideries, gar-
ments, laces, woven fabrics, or any smaller articles.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF CLAIMS
To COPYRIGHT, BuLL. No. 15, § 12(g) (1910).
21. 37 C.F.R. § 201.4(7) (1917).
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or unpublished works of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are con-
cerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapes-
tries, as well as works belonging to the fine arts ... ."22 Forty
years after Congress had forsaken the limitation, the Copyright
Office formally abandoned the attempt to restrict the reach of
copyright to works of the "fine arts." A reference to "works of
artistic craftsmanship" was all that remained of the barrier be-
tween copyright and the design of utilitarian products. Atten-
tion then shifted from administrative to judicial formulations.
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court considered a
copyright infringement claim involving china statuettes of Bali-
nese dancing figures. The contestants in Mazer v. Stein23 were
rival lamp manufacturers. The copyright owner, with the addi-
tion of the appropriate hardware, employed the statuettes as
bases for table lamps. The statuettes, sans sockets and wiring,
were registered with the Copyright Office as "'works of art" and
"reproductions of a work of art."2 4 A competitor copied the
figures and put them to a similar use.
The defendants premised their response to the charge of
infringement chiefly on the federal design patent law, which
protects "any new, original and ornamental design for an arti-
cle of manufacture." 25 Only design patents, they argued, could
monopolize the appearance of mass-produced utilitarian arti-
cles. The Court did not agree: "Neither the Copyright Statute
nor any other says that because a thing is patentable it may not
be copyrighted. We should not so hold."26 The contention that
useful articles were beyond the limits of copyright was formally
put to rest:
The dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility
but art for the copyright and the invention of original and ornamental
design for design patents. We find nothing in the copyright statute to
support the argument that the intended use or use in industry of an ar-
ticle eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration. We do
not read such a limitation into the copyright law.27
22. 37 C.FR. § 202.10(a) (1949).
23. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
24. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 5(g), 5(h), 35 Stat 1077 (current
version at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976)).
25. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976). See infra note 30.
26. 347 U.S. at 217.
27. Id. at 218. The Copyright Office had by this time registered a variety of
utilitarian articles, including "book ends, clocks, lamps, door knockers, candle-
sticks, inkstands, chandeliers, piggy banks, sundials, salt and pepper shakers,
fish bowls, casseroles, and ash trays." Id. at 221 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Some of these items, however, may not be protected under the more intricate
standard currently in effect. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
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Mazer, however, fell far short of a wholesale endorsement
of copyright in the design of useful objects. The Court was
quick to point out the narrow issue for decision: '"The case re-
quires an answer, not as to a manufacturer's right to register a
lamp base but as to an artist's right to copyright a work of art
intended to be reproduced for lamp bases."28 The statuettes, as
works of art, were entitled to copyright. Neither prior nor sub-
sequent use in utilitarian articles, nor the fact that they were
conceived expressly for such an end, jeopardized that status.
Utility and art were no longer mutually exclusive, but it was
still only the latter that could command copyright. Mazer an-
swered one question, yet wisely eschewed another. The use to
which "works of art" are put is irrelevant, the Court declared,
but the bounds of that statutory classification remained uncer-
tain. A dancing figure qualified, but the Court had said nothing
of the forms displayed by toasters or automobiles, or the de-
signs of wedding gowns or belt buckles.
Those seeking protection for the full range of industrial de-
sign could find comfort in the Court's echo of Justice Holmes:
"Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to
permit a narrow or rigid concept of art."29 Yet to apply the stat-
utory criterion, some conception of art, or more precisely some
conception of section 5(g) "works of art," remained a necessity.
Most of the suggested models, however, did not assimilate in-
dustrial design.
Tests emphasizing aesthetic merit had little to recommend
them. The "inventiveness" criterion of federal design patent
law imposed a similar analysis in that regime with disastrous
results.30 In the copyright sphere, most judges prudently
28. 347 U.S. at 205.
29. Id. at 214.
30. Since 1842, federal patent law has made express provision for the pro-
tection of ornamental designs. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 544 (cur-
rent version at 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976)). Patents have issued for the design of
objects ranging from hosiery reinforcements, Glen Raven Knitting Mills, Inc. v.
Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc., 189 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1951), to concrete mixer trucks,
In re Koehring, 37 F.2d 421 (C.C.P.A. 1930). See C.F. Mueller Co. v. A. Zeregas
Sons, 12 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1926) (design patent on noodle shape invalid). Cur-
rent law provides: 'Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design
for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the condi-
tions and requirements of this title. The provisions of this title relating to pat-
ents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise
provided." 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976).
The overlap between the subject matters of design patent and copyright
raises the possibility of dual protection. Early case law put the creator to an
election. See, e.g., In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (hosiery ticket);
Louis De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 182 F. 150, 152 (E.D. Pa. 1910)
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(Christmas wrapping paper) (dicta), affd on other grounds, 191 F. 35 (3d Cir.
1911), affd, 235 U.S. 33 (1914). The Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 217 (1954), noted the prior case law, but found it unnecessary to consider
the election doctrine, because the plaintiff had not sought design patent protec-
tion. In 1974, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals repudiated the concept
of election in reversing a Patent and Trademark Office decision to reject a pat-
ent application for a previously copyrighted Spiro Agnew watch. In re Yardley,
493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974). The Copyright Office, however, continues to
refuse registration once a design patent has issued. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1981).
The position appears difficult to rationalize in view of section 102(a) of the
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976), which provides that copyright "sub-
sists" in works "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." See Frijouf, Si-
multaneous Copyright and Patent Protection, 23 COPYRIGHT L SYmp. 99, 109-11
(1977); Note, Functional Works of Art: Copyright Design Paten or Both?, 3
Comm/ENT L.J. 83, 102-03 (1980).
Unlike copyright, with its modest requirements of originality, generally un-
derstood to be "little more than a prohibition of actual copying," Alfred Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951) (quoting Hoague-
Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)), and
some minimal degree of creativity or effort, see Denicola, Copyright in Collec-
tions of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81
COLum. L. Rav. 516, 520-22 (1981), the barriers to design protection are impos-
ing. As a result of the novelty requirement, independent creation is not suffi-
cient. Rather, the design must produce a new visual impression, generally
measured with reference to an ordinary observer. See 2 A. DELLER, WA=KR ON
PATENTs § 159 (1964). The design must also be "ornamental," thus necessitat-
ing at least a minimal assessment of its aesthetic impact. Id. § 160.
The reference in section 171 of the design patent law to provisions relating
to inventions, however, introduces a more troublesome requirement. See 35
U.S.C. § 171 (1976). Section 103 of the patent statute prohibits the issuance of a
patent when "the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). The "non-
obviousness" test is a 1952 codification of the "inventiveness" standard gener-
ally applied to applications for both mechanical and design patents. See 2 A.
DELLER, supra, § 161. Whatever utility the standard may have with respect to
mechanical patents, however, it has been little short of ruinous in the design
patent regime.
On a doctrinal level, application of the "person having ordinary skill in the
art" standard in the design context has generated a semantic dispute between
proponents of an "ordinary observer" standard and those who advocate an "or-
dinary designer" benchmark. See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1216-17
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (reviewing the conflicting case law). One suspects that the se-
mantics have little substantive impact. "It is probably true ... that ... courts
will, with phraseology of their own choosing, continue to find designs patenta-
ble or unpatentable according to their judicial 'hunches.' Id. at 1218 (Rich, J.,
concurring). On a more fundamental level, an obviousness test for aesthetic
contributions appears to demand the very artistic judgments and analysis
wisely shunned by copyright law. But cf. Belding Heminway Co. v. Future
Fashions, Inc., 143 F.2d 216, 217-18 (2d Cir. 1944) ('That there may be as out-
standing aesthetic invention as there is mechanical, only barbarians would
deny." Unfortunately, the barbarians cannot be relied on to recuse them-
selves.). The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks has acknowledged that
"the concept of unobviousness is not well suited to ornamental designs." Ad-
dress by Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Gerald Mossinghoff, ABA
1983]
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shunned the role of art critic.31 A more appealing approach
was to turn to history in an attempt to cabin the reach of copy-
right. In one of the series of cases brought by the plaintiff in
Mazer, the Ninth Circuit stated, "A thing is a work of art if it
appears to be within the historical and ordinary conception of
the term art."32 The rationale admitted statuettes, but ex-
cluded a cardboard photo holder.33 Although this formulation
was perhaps an improvement over purely subjective evalua-
tions of artistic merit, as a practical matter it could furnish lit-
tle guidance in specific cases. With museums proudly
displaying the pottery, weapons, furnishings, and other arti-
facts of preceding cultures, the sweep of the rationale might
well exceed the expectations of its proponents. Emphasis on a
"colloquial rather than a philosophical significance"3 4 for
Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Section Meeting (Aug. 8, 1981), quoted
in In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1219 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
Reliance on so subjective a standard inevitably has its price. "In final anal-
ysis it depends upon the judgment of the judge or judges who have the last
say." Gold Seal Importers, Inc. v. Morris White Fashions, Inc., 124 F.2d 141, 143
(2d Cir. 1941) (invalidating design patent for lack of inventiveness). A study by
the Patent and Trademark Office indicated that an astonishing 68% of design
patents challenged in federal courts during the period from 1973 to 1977 were
held invalid. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, STUDY OF COURT DETERMINA-
TIONS OF PATENT VAIDrrY/INvALiDrrY, 1973-1977, reprinted in 455 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) D-1 - D-3 (1979). Although the sample produced
by decisions to contest validity is undoubtedly biased toward questionable pat-
ents, the statistics clearly justify the ill repute generally attached to design pat-
ent law. The insecurity is particularly troubling in light of the effort and
expense necessary to obtain issuance of a design patent.
Because of the necessity of evaluating novelty and nonobviousness, the
patent application process is substantially more protracted than copyright re-
gistration procedures. In 1975, the average time between filing and issuance
was reported to be about twenty-one months. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECOND SuP-
PLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVI-
SION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw: 1975 REviSION BILL 187 (Draft 1975)
[hereinafter cited as SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]. Costs, including attor-
ney's fees, can quickly become prohibitive for small enterprises, particularly
when a number of new designs are to be introduced. It is hardly surprising
that both the Copyright Office and the Patent and Trademark Office have urged
the enactment of alternative design protection legislation. Id. at 186-87, 203; Ad-
dress by Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Gerald Mossinghoff, supra.
31. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 243
(1903) (circus poster); Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1955) (chim-
panzee doll); Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1924) (miniature
religious shrine).
32. Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1953).
33. See Bailie v. Fisher, 258 F.2d 425, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1958). - The historical
approach to the "works of art" classification has also been championed in the
academic literature. See Comment, supra note 6, at 660.
34. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches Co. v. Benrus Watch Co,




"works of art" only transfered aesthetic judgments to a differ-
ent jury. Moreover, given the selective additions to the statu-
tory subject matter that preceded the "works of art"
classification, there was no reason to suspect that the new cate-
gory was intended to subsume every object that either curator
or bumpkin might label "art."
In retrospect, Mazer v. Stein did little to clarify the issue of
copyright in the design of commercial products; it merely en-
joined the automatic excision of all utilitarian articles. Al-
though the Copyright Office Regulations soon reflected the
Court's narrow holding,35 the administrative response did not
end with codification. Determined to close the door that Mazer
left ajar, the Copyright Office sought a formulation that would
accommodate Mazer, yet exclude the general realm of indus-
trial design. After one aborted attempt,36 it settled on the "sep-
arability" standard that has come to dominate current analysis:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the
article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of
art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorporates features,
such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which
can be identified separately and are capable of existing independently
as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.3 7
Mazer had quickly become the limit of copyright in useful
articles.
Even the guarded terms of Mazer and its regulatory prog-
eny, however, brought major change. Overcoming a long-stand-
ing exclusion,38 graphic designs adorning textiles were now
securely within the subject matter of copyright.39 The regula-
35. In order to be acceptable as a work of art, the work must embody
some creative authorship in its delineation or form. The registrability
of a work of art is not affected by the intention of the author as to the
use of the work, the number of copies reproduced, or the fact that it
appears on a textile material or textile product. The potential availabil-
ity of protection under the design patent law will not affect the registra-
bility of a work of art ....
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (Supp. 1956) (current version at 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a)
(1981)).
36. See 37 C.F. § 202.10(c) (Supp. 1956).
37. 37 C.F. § 202.10(c) (1959) (revoked Jan. 1, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 966
(1978)).
38. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929)
(dicta), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); Verney Corp. v. Rose Fabric Convert-
ers Corp., 87 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Cf. Kemp & Beatley, Inc. v.
Hirsch, 34 F.2d 291, 292 (E.D.N.Y. 1929) (dress pattern).
39. See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,
489 (2d Cir. 1960); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334,
335 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants & Manuf., Inc.,
173 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics,
Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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tions said as much.40 Indeed, any two-dimensional graphic
work could arguably be "identified separately" from the utilita-
rian article to which it was applied, and copyright registrations
were issued in connection with graphic designs appearing on
products ranging from shoe soles 41 to dinnerware.42 Yet there
were limits. When the graphic elements went beyond mere ap-
plique and became more intimately associated with the utilita-
rian features of the article, protection was denied.43
The test of separate identity and independent existence
could be particularly troublesome when the copyright claim
was directed at three-dimensional aspects of utilitarian articles.
Some objects presented little difficulty. The "Flying Lady"
hood ornament could be detached from the accompanying
Rolls-Royce, yielding a perfectly independent statuette. With a
bit more imagination, gargoyles could be mentally chiseled
from pediments, and lamp shades and sockets stripped from
dancing figures. The case law, however, presented greater chal-
lenges. For example, it seemed natural to extend protection to
children's coin banks shaped in forms ranging from dogs44 to
humans,45 despite the difficulty in identifying features "capable
of existing independently." The "work of art" was the bank it-
self. If the overall shape of a cocker spaniel bank was pro-
tectible, could anything more than aesthetic prejudice exclude
the overall shapes of tea kettles, home computers, or food
processors? Other cases similarly undermined the administra-
tive criterion. Copyright was upheld in a ring box with no men-
40. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (Supp. 1956) (current version at 37 C.FL
§ 202.10(a) (1981)). See also supra note 35.
41. See SCOA Indus., Inc. v. Famolare, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 216
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
42. See Syracuse China Corp. v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 527
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). Attempts to obtain copyright for two-dimensional designs on
useful objects had met with some success even before Mazer. See, e.g., Rich-
ardson v. Miller, 20 F. Cas. 722 (C.C.D. Mass. 1877) (No. 11,791) (playing cards);
William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264
(W.D. Pa. 1951) ("loop" design on glassware). Cf. Ex parte Guild, 98 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 464 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1952) (copyright registration on roof design).
43. See Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978) (type-face de-
sign); Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 155
F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) affd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958)
(appearance of watch face not copyrightable under initial post-Mazer regula-
tion, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (Supp. 1956)).
44. See Royalty Designs, Inc. v. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 204 F. Supp. 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).




tion of separability,46 and registration issued for a series of
molds used in the manufacture of ceramic figures. 47 Yet such
objects offered no obviously separable elements; the art lay in
the articles themselves.
The gap between copyright and industrial design was fur-
ther narrowed when copyright was recognized in an antique
telephone shape used as the outer casing of a pencil sharp-
ener.48 The court, concluding that the Copyright Office regula-
tions did not preclude protection because "the telephone casing
could be separated physically from the pencil sharpener,"49 de-
clared the casing a "work of art" and enjoined the defendant
from distributing a substantially similar product. But casings,
covers, and cabinets could be removed from a host of commer-
cial products, and the regulations offered little basis for
distinctions.
Despite the shortcomings of the doctrinal formulations,50
both the courts and the Copyright Office maintained the convic-
tion that copyright protection for the general design of commer-
cial products was inappropriate. Efforts to achieve a general
revision of the copyright law began within a year after the deci-
sion in Mazer v. Stein, and throughout the twenty-one years of
legislative machinations that preceded the enactment of the
current statute, the Copyright Office consistently counseled
against the extension of copyright to industrial design.5'
46. See Dan Kasoff; Inc. v. Gresco Jewelry Co., 204 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), afOd, 308 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1962).
47. See S-K Potteries & Mold Co. v. Sipes, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537 (N.D.
Ind. 1976) (no determination of copyright validity).
48. See Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
49. Id.
50. The basic criterion applied by the Copyright Office to determine
registrability as a work of art is the existence of artistic features which
cai be identified separately from any utilitarian article and which are
capable of existing independently from the article as works of art. The
difficulty of administering this criterion is one reason for the support
given by the Copyright Office for specialized design legislation.
Hearings on HR. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) (Copyright Office Briefing Papers on Current Issues Raised by
H.R. 2223, May 7, 1975), reprinted in 16 OmNmus COPYRGHT REVISION LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY 2051, 2066 (1977).
51. In the years since the Mazer decision, full protection under the
copyright law has not proved inappropriate for "works of art" used as a
design or decoration of useful articles. We do not believe, however,
that it would be appropriate to extend the copyright law to industrial
designs as such.
HouSE Comm. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REvI-
SION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 13 (Comm. Print 1961).
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11. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
A. THE REVISION EFFORT
The decision to undertake a major revision of United States
copyright law provided proponents of protection for industrial
design a unique opportunity. Influenced perhaps by the posi-
tion of the Copyright Office, however, their energies focused
not on copyright per se, but rather on a series of companion
bills offering sui generis protection for ornamental designs of
useful articles.
In a 1961 report, the Copyright Office reaffirmed its opposi-
tion to the extension of copyright in useful articles beyond that
available under its existing regulations. 52 Noting the anticom-
petitive consequences of broad protection for commercial de-
sign, the report concluded that the duration of copyright and
the potential liability of innocent distributors, together with
other specifics of the copyright system, made copyright protec-
tion unsuitable for industrial design.5 3 Instead, the report
urged consideration of separate industrial design legislation.
The suggestion was hardly novel. Bills for the protection of in-
dustrial design had been introduced regularly since the turn of
the century,54 and the issue had generated a plethora of con-
flicting analysis. The Copyright Office itself had developed an
extensive bibliography on the subject.55
During the 1960's, separate design protection bills passed
the Senate on three occasions. 56 In 1969, the Senate formally
joined the design proposals with copyright revision.57 Carried
by the momentum of the revision effort, design protection legis-
lation appeared as Title II of the general copyright revision bill
when the Senate ultimately forwarded the legislation to the
House in 1976.58 Title II provided protection for the "original
ornamental design of a useful article."59 "Staple or common-
place" designs were excluded, together with those "dictated
solely by a utilization function of the article."60 Protection ex-
52. See id.
53. See id. See generally Ringer, The Case for Design Protection and the
O'Mahoney Bil 7 BuLL. COPYRPGHT Soc'y 25 (1960).
54. See supra note 6.
55. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, BMLOGRAPHY ON DESIGN PROTECTION (1955 &
Supp. 1959). The Bibliography was further updated in 1976. See supra note 7.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 50.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 49-50.
59. S. 22, tit. H, supra note 6, § 201(a).
60. Id. § 202. In an effort to win congressional approval, the three-dimen-
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tended for a maximum of ten years, 61 and prohibited the manu-
facture, importation, or sale of articles "the design of which has
been copied from the protected design, without the consent of
the proprietor."62 The bill established administrative machin-
ery for the registration of protectible designs, but left to the
President the designation of the appropriate governmental of-
fice to oversee the scheme.63 Title I provided that copyright in
works utilized in connection with useful articles was unaffected
by the protection available under Title I, unless the proprietor
actually obtained a Title HI registration.64
Title II, designated the Design Protection Act of 1975,65 did
not survive consideration in the House. The Judiciary Commit-
tee "chose to delete Title II in part because the new form of de-
sign protection provided by Title H could not truly be
considered copyright protection and therefore appropriately
within the scope of copyright revision." 66 The House Report
made passing reference to the bill's failure to designate a spe-
cific agency to administer the system, although the Copyright
Office had by this time volunteered its services, 67 and to the un-
resolved issue of protection for typeface designs.68 The princi-
pal objection, however, was more fundamental:
Finally, the Committee will have to examine further the assertion of
the Department of Justice, which testified in opposition to the Title,
that Title 11 would create a new monopoly which has not been justified
by a showing that its benefits will outweigh the disadvantage of remov-
ing such designs from free public use.6 9
Proponents of specialized design protection were left only with
sional shape of wearing apparel was also excluded. Id. § 202(3). See SECOND
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 30, at 204.
61. S. 22, tit. II, supra note 6, § 205.
62. Id. § 208. "Innocent" retailers were afforded a broad measure of protec-
tion. Id. §208(a)(2).
63. Id. § 230.
64. S. 22, tit. I, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 113(c), 122 CONG. REC. 3841, 3845
(1975), reprinted in S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975). Passage of
Title II would thus not have eliminated the need to confront the issue of copy-
right in useful articles.
65. S. 22, tit. II, supra note 6, § 235.
66. HR. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 50.
67. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1975); SECOND SUPPLEMEN-
TARY REPORT, supra note 30, at 205-06.
68. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 50. The question of copyright or
other protection for typeface designs had stirred considerable controversy dur-
ing the latter stages of the revision effort. Of particular concern was the possi-
bility of "creating exclusive rights for a few big manufacturers, who would use
them to enforce tying arrangements between their machines and fonts," and
the specter of "suits to enjoin publication of printed matter" composed from in-
fringing type. SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 30, at 201.
69. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 50. The Conference Committee ac-
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an invitation to try again.70
The legislative energy necessary to grapple with the issue
of design protection was apparently exhausted in the formula-
tion of Title H. In the copyright revision bill itself, there was
old wine in old bottles. The cornerstone of the revision bill's
approach to copyright in useful articles was a narrow codifica-
tion of Mazer, 7 1 which Congress read as holding "that works of
art which are incorporated into the design of useful articles,
but which are capable of standing by themselves as art works
separate from the useful article, are copyrightable." 72 The
"works of art" classification of the 1909 Act was abandoned and
replaced by a reference to "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works." 73 This new category endeavored to supply "as clear a
line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and
uncopyrighted works of industrial design."74 The line, however,
was neither clear nor new. After declaring that "pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works" included works of "applied art,"
the definition stated:
[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be con-
sidered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the
extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of ex-
isting independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
7 5
ceded to the House position. See H.L REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 82
(1976).
70. The issues raised by Title 1 have not been resolved by its deletion
from the Copyright Revision Bill. Therefore, the Committee believes
that it will be necessary to reconsider the question of design protection
in new legislation during the 95th Congress. At that time more com-
plete hearings on the subject may be held and, without the encum-
brance of a general copyright revision bill, the issues raised in Title H
of S. 22 may be resolved.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 50. 'The full range of design protection is-
sues, however, stands as one of the most significant and pressing items of un-
finished business now on the Congressional agenda." Ringer, The Unfinished
Business of Copyright Revision, 24 U.C.LA. l REV. 951, 976 (1977). For the lat-
est effort, see H.R. 20, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT L.
REP. (CCH) 20,097 (1981).
71. "Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section,
the exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work in copies under section 106 includes the right to reproduce the work in or
on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise." 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1976).
See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works").
72. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 50.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (5) (1976).
74. M.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55. The Report refers to the effort
to achieve clear lines and distinctions twice in the space of three paragraphs,
apparently seeking credit at least for good intentions.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). In its entirety, the definition states:
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The administrative regulations of the 1950's were now formally
codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.76
The legislative history sheds additional light on the famil-
iar criteria of separate identity and independent existence.
Two-dimensional graphic works and three-dimensional carv-
ings or statues incorporated into utilitarian articles can exist
independently as works of art and are thus eligible for copy-
right.77 Congress was unmistakably clear, however, that it in-
tended to exclude industrial design from the subject matter of
copyright:
On the other hand, although the shape of an industrial product may be
aesthetically satisfying and valuable, the Committee's intention is not
to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an
automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or any
other industrial product contains some element that, physically or con-
ceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of
that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill.
7 8
The reference to "physically or conceptually"79 separable ele-
ments perhaps extended prior law, but little else was new.
"Applied art" was in and "industrial design" was out. Yet at
some point the two met, and "separability" had already proven
a poor benchmark.
The failure to win protection for industrial design reflects
more than the vagaries of the legislative process. Sixty years of
unsuccessful lobbying suggests more substantive difficulties.
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photo-
graphs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, technical
drawings, diagrams, and models. Such works shall include works of ar-
tistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or
utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as de-
fined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified sepa-
rately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilita-
rian aspects of the article.
Id. A definition of "useful article" is also provided: "A 'useful article' is an arti-
cle having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the ap-
pearance of the article or to convey information. An article that is normally a
part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article."' Id.
76. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1976)).
77. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55.
78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added). The Copyright Office had previously employed
the phrase "conceptually separated" in an effort to describe the import of its
existing regulation on separability. See SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra
note 30, at 194. But see Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803-04 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) (dismissing the House Report's "isolated
reference" to conceptual separability).
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One can appreciate the reluctance of Congress to subsume in-
dustrial design within the scope of copyright, or to authorize a
more specialized monopoly, by considering the basic argu-
ments generally used to support the recognition of proprietary
rights in intellectual property.
The Constitution, authorizing legislation "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,"80 suggests an incentive
rationale designed to encourage artistic and inventive activity
through the prospect of exclusive rights in the tangible results
of creative efforts.81 Such stimuli may be necessary, it is ar-
gued, when the ease of copying impedes the producer's ability
to extract through the market the reward that consumers
would otherwise willingly pay. Without protection against
copying, there may be less investment of resources in creative
activity than society would wish. Such proprietary rights must
be limited, of course, or the public will be effectively denied the
benefits sought by the constitutional mandate. At this level,
the copyright and patent laws reflect a balance between incen-
tive and dissemination through competition.
This economic perspective is sometimes supplemented by
moral appeals. The idea of a natural right to the fruits of one's
labors, and the aversion to permitting the enrichment of an-
other at the producer's expense, are no less powerful here than
in other areas of the law.82 In the realm of artistic works, there
is the further notion that the intimate relationship between art
and artist justifies special efforts to preserve the integrity of the
work.83 From both economic and moral vantage points, how-
ever, the case for expansive design protection is weak.
The most obvious effect of extending copyright or more
specialized protection to the design of commercial products
would be the exclusion of such designs from the public domain,
thus preventing their free use by competing manufacturers.8 4
The necessity of such an artificial incentive, however, is hardly
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
81. '"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."' Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
82. See Denicola, supra note 30, at 519-20.
83. See 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21 (1982).
84. At present, only those designs capable of meeting the stringent re-




clear.8 5 In one sense, manufacturers do not have the option of
discontinuing the creation of industrial designs, since all prod-
ucts must take on some shape and appearance. Thus the ques-
tion is not whether manufacturers will design, but rather how
large an investment of resources they will devote to the devel-
opment of designs possessing some particular virtue or appeal.
Even without the stimulus provided by the prospect of a statu-
tory monopoly, there appear to be significant incentives to in-
vest in design. If that is indeed the case, restraints on
competition may achieve little in the way of increased design
activity.
The most obvious incentive to produce appealing designs is
the desire to attract customers, since "[b] etween two products
equal in price, function, and quality, the better looking will out-
sell the other."86 Even a design that is merely different rather
than "better" may have its advantages, because it may appeal
to a desire for diversity or distinctiveness and aid in marketing
by differentiating the product from its rivals. By accentuating
performance characteristics such as strength, durability, or
workmanship, an appropriate design may increase sales even
when aesthetic appeal is not a significant consideration. Effort
invested in design may also result in enhanced performance or
reduced production costs. 87
Given the obvious advantage of a well conceived product
design, the question becomes whether the risk of appropriation
by a competitor will nevertheless cause manufacturers to sig-
nificantly decrease their investment of resources in design ac-
tivity. For several reasons, the answer may often be "No." The
cost of creating an appealing design, for example, may repre-
sent only a small fraction of total product development and pro-
duction costs. With so much at stake, a manufacturer is
unlikely to forego the substantial benefits of a well designed
product merely because a competitor might gain a marginal
85. This was the chief justification for the opposition of the Department of
Justice to Title II of the revision bill. Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (testimony of Irwin Gold-
bloom), reprinted in 14 OmNius COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
139-40 (1977).
86. R. LOEWY, INDusTRIAL DESIGN 10 (1979).
87. If the cost of manufacturing a more attractive product is high enough
to price the resulting article above the range consumers are willing to pay, how-
ever, even a statutory monopoly will not prompt production, if indeed produc-
tion is desirable. The prospect of a monopoly in a product that cannot be sold
at a profit is hardly enticing.
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saving through design piracy. If the design is indeed advanta-
geous, even a relatively short lead time may be sufficient to
permit recovery of design costs. In addition, the risk of copying
may frequently be overstated. Outside the limited reach of de-
sign patent law, no legal barrier currently exists to prevent de-
sign piracy. Yet variations in product appearance continue to
be the norm. Indeed, there are disincentives to copying. Prod-
uct differentiation may be as valuable to a competitor as to the
design originator. Major competitors may be reluctant to tar-
nish their image by engaging in design piracy, since consumers
frequently associate copies with lower quality and desirability.
Copying may sometimes cause consumers to confuse the copy
with the original, thus creating potential liability in an action
for trademark infringement or unfair competition. 88 Even when
88. In an effort to forestall confusion and deceit, the common law of unfair
competition has long prohibited the copying of nonfunctional product and
container shapes that the public has come to associate with a particular manu-
facturer. See 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADEmAR S AND UNFAIR COMPETrION § 7:23
(1973). This common law protection, however, was called into question by the
Supreme Court's decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Both
decisions indicated that state law could not prohibit the copying of articles left
unprotected by federal patent and copyright law, regardless of the potential for
consumer confusion. Sears and Compeo, however, had little effect on the pro-
tection of product shapes under federal trademark law. The Patent and Trade-
mark Office has continued to extend protection to shapes and configurations
that function as an indication of source. See, e.g., In re Mogen David Wine
Corp., 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (protection denied for lack of source signifi-
cance); In re Days-Ease Home Product Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566 (T.M.
Trial App. Bd. 1977) (registration granted for shape of liquid drain opener
container). Even shapes and designs that have not been federally registered as
trademarks have been able to escape the thrust of Sears and Compco through
the invocation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976),
which prohibits any "false designation of origin, or any false description or rep-
resentation." See, e.g., SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc.,
625 F.2d 1055, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1980); Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co.,
601 F.2d 631, 641-44 (2d Cir. 1979) (dicta), on remand, 488 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds,
102 S. Ct. 2182, 2193 (1982) (White and Marshall, JJ., concurring) ('The use of a
product or package design that is so similar to that of another producer that it
is likely to confuse purchasers as to the product's source may constitute 'false
designation of origin'... ."); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d
1210, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). With surprising
pluck, several courts have simply rejected the rationale of Sears and Compco
and continued to offer protection under state unfair competition law. See, e.g.,
SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1064-65 (3d
Cir. 1980); Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 908-10
(D.N.J. 1976); Duo-Tint Bulb & Battery Co. v. Moline Supply Co., 46 Il. App. 3d
145, 150-51, 360 N.E.2d 798, 802 (1977) (dicta).
The Supreme Court retreated from its unbending approach to preemption
in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), holding that the patent and copy-
right clause did not preclude state protection of "writings," and that the 1909
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copying does occur, its impact may be modest if the utilitarian
Copyright Act did not preempt protection of works that it had left "unat-
tended," since for such works Congress had "drawn no balance." Id. at 570.
The Court again considered the relationship between federal and state protec-
tion for intellectual property in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974). After declaring that the constitutional clause did not withdraw from the
states all power to regulate with respect to "discoveries," thus completing the
analysis of the clause begun by Goldstein, the Court concluded that state pro-
tection of intellectual property was not void under the supremacy clause even
when extended to areas covered by federal legislation, unless the state scheme
clashed with federal objectives. Id. at 478-79.
In the context of federal trademark registration, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals has on numerous occasions taken pains to point out that trade-
mark protection does not conflict with the objectives of design patent law. See,
e.g., In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1080 (1974); In re World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 1015 (C.C.P.A.
1973); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 928-30 (C.C.P.A. 1964). Con-
sequently, there appears to be little danger that even state trademark protec-
tion for nonfunctional product shapes is preempted by federal design patent
law. See Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 689-
99 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
The preemptive force of federal copyright law is now delimited by section
301 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). State protection of
works within the subject matter of copyright is preempted if the rights afforded
are equivalent to copyright. One might argue that since the design aspects of
useful articles are copyrightable only if separable from the utilitarian aspects
of the object, nonseparable designs are thus not within the subject matter of
copyright. See Vermont Castings, Inc. v. Evans Prods. Co., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
758 (D. Vt. 1981). See also Leonard Storch Enterprises, Inc. v. Mergenthaler Li-
notype Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 623 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (1909 Act). Cf. Goldstein,
Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses:
Testing the Limits of Copyrigh 24 U.C.LA. L Ruv. 1107, 1118-20 (1977) (making
an analogous argument with respect to ideas, procedures, and other contribu-
tions expressly excluded from copyright by 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976)). Such an
approach, however, ignores the basic premise of the subject matter test. Essen-
tially a codification of Goldstein, the test is apparently intended to permit state
regulation of areas left "unattended" by copyright law. Yet Congress has in
fact drawn a balance with respect to industrial designs, excluding all non-
separable elements from protection. The viability of state laws touching indus-
trial design should therefore turn on whether the state rights are "equivalent"
to copyright.
Since relief under principles of state trademark or unfair competition law
generally requires a showing of consumer confusion or deception, these state
regimes have not been considered "equivalent" to copyright protection for pur-
poses of section 301. See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Associates, 486 F.
Supp. 1273, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 207
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 664, 668 (N.D. Ga. 1980). Thus the traditional common law pro-
tection extended to nonfunctional product shapes and features that have ac-
quired source significance is not preempted by current copyright law.
Occasionally, however, despite the consumer confusion rhetoric, protection ap-
pears to rest primarily on a notion of misappropriation through unauthorized
copying. See, e.g., Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F.
Supp. 689, 694 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Denicola, Trademark& as Speech: Constitutional
Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols,
1982 Wis. L. REv. 158, 166-81. When the misappropriation rationale is surrepti-
tiously implemented by means of federal law, such as sections 32 or 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1976), see, e.g., Boston Professional
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qualities of the original cannot be duplicated because of
mechanical patent or trade secret protection, or because of the
copier's less sophisticated production capabilities.
The moral claims to industrial design protection are also
significantly weaker than those that might be made with re-
spect to other artistic works. The threat of unjust enrichment
is less worrisome than in other contexts, since we associate in-
dustrial design with the well-lighted drafting rooms of large
commercial- entities, and thus there are no images of starving
novelists or destitute painters to tug at our heartstrings. For
similar reasons, we are less concerned with artistic reputation
or integrity. On a less emotional level, the arguments offered
suggest that both the risk of appropriation and the extent of
the potential harm are generally less for the industrial designer
than for the novelist, movie producer, or songwriter. Finally,
the exclusion of industrial design from the scope of copyright
need not be taken as an indictment of its validity or impor-
tance. The law of intellectual property covers but a small por-
tion of the full range of creative activity,89 and there is no
dishonor in joining the theories of Einstein or the insights of
Freud in the public domain.
Copyright protection for industrial design would also pres-
ent severe practical difficulties. The idea-expression dichotomy
and the "substantial similarity" test of copyright infringement
may be too ephemeral to adequately protect legitimate compet-
itive interests, particularly when commercial realities limit the
Hockey Assoc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975), the preemption issue is avoided. 17 U.S.C. § 301(d)
(1976). When the common law is relied on to forestall the misappropriation of
another's design efforts, however, the state right may indeed be equivalent to
copyright, thus raising the bar of section 301. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v.
Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 918-19 (2d Cir. 1980). Cf. Suid v. Newsweek Magazine,
503 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D.D.C. 1980) (unfair competition claim based on unau-
thorized use of literary material preempted); Mitchell v. Penton/Indus. Pub.
Co., 486 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (same). See generally 1 M. NnMM,
supra note 83, § 1.01[B].
89. IT]he fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money
and labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not
sufficient to ensure to it this legal attribute of property. The general
rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions-knowledge,
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to common use.
International News Serv. v. Associated Press Inc., 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976) ("In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, pro-
cedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embod-
ied in such work.").
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range of design alternatives.9 0 In addition, the specter of in-
fringement may actually inhibit experimentation with new de-
signs, or require additional expenditures to assess potential
legal risks.
The arguments for and against design protection are long-
standing.91 They inevitably rest on a host of assumptions that
cannot possibly hold across the wide range of goods and mar-
kets encompassed by the controversy. The fact remains, how-
ever, that Congress has emphatically declined to extend
copyright protection to industrial design, and the Copyright Act
of 1976 must be construed in light of that fundamental decision.
Yet, care must be taken to avoid indiscriminate application of
the statutory exclusion to works whose origins lie beyond the
confines of the design process.
B. CONVENTIONAL MODELS
The Copyright Office regulation that introduced the separa-
bility test, following the Supreme Court decision in Mazer v.
Stein, excluded from the "works of art" classification any arti-
cle whose "sole intrinsic function ... is its utility."92 That for-
mulation, however, had the disquieting potential to defeat all
efforts to bar industrial design from the scope of copyright.
Given judicial reluctance to assess artistic merit, there was no
ready response to the claims of industrial designers that their
work was not solely utilitarian, since it was also offered as art.
An object serving aesthetic as well as utilitarian ends appeared
beyond the reach of the regulatory limitation. Obviously, the
administrative intent was not to abandon the grist for its mill,
but the difficulty did underscore the primitive nature of the
doctrinal machinery.
90. See, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 1524-27; Comment, Copyright Protection
for Mass-Produced, Commercial Products: A Review of the Developments Fol-
lowing Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. CHL L. REV. 807, 809-14 (1971).
91. The dispute is not unique to American law. See, e.g., Cornish, Cumula-
tive Protection for Industrial Designs, 8 U. BRIT. COLUmBiA L. REV. 219 (1973);
Crew, Undesirable in Theory, Absurd in Practice-the Protection of Industrial
Designs in England and New Zealand, 2 AUCKLAND U.L. REV. No. 4, 1 (1975);
Moon, Copyright in Artistic Works: The Extension to Mechanical Design; 1979
N. ZEALAND L.J. 282 (1979); Moon, A Functional View of Copyrigh4 Designs and
Patents, 8 VICTORIA U.L REV. 300 (1976); Wallace, Protection for Designs in the
United Kingdom, 22 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 437 (1975). For the most recent
British proposals, see UNITED KINGDOM GREEN PAPER: REFORm OF THE LAw RE-
LATING TO COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS AND PERFORMERS' PROTECTION, reprinted in 28
Bum.. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 569, 573-77 (1981).




The concept of a useful article, as embodied in the "sole in-
trinsic function" standard, played a role in an important 1966
decision that provided designers a welcome precedent. In Ted
Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft C., 93 the court recognized copyright
in the casing of a pencil sharpener simulating the appearance
of an antique telephone: "[W]e would not agree with defend-
ant that its 'sole intrinsic function ... is its utility.' Customers
are paying fifteen dollars for it, not because it sharpens pencils
uncommonly well, but because it is also a decorative conversa-
tion piece."9
As the revision effort was nearing its conclusion, another
case tested the bounds of the useful article classification. Es-
quire, Inc. v. Ringer95 was a mandamus action to compel the
Register of Copyrights to issue a registration for the design of
an outdoor lighting fixture "of pleasing shape ... well suited to
accompany structures of so-called functional design."96 The
Copyright Office denied registration on the ground that the
work lacked features that could be identified separately as art.
Esquire argued that its fixtures were modern sculptures, and
thus their "sole intrinsic function" was not utility. The district
court apparently agreed: "These outdoor lights serve both to
decorate and to illuminate. Indeed, during the day they are ex-
clusively decorative."97 On appeal, however, Esquire's sum-
mary judgment was reversed. In a novel interpretive
maneuver, the court alluded to the deletion of the word "sole"
in the revision bill's definition of "useful article," and pro-
ceeded to construe the existing regulation in light of the as yet
inoperative statutory formulation.98
The separability test contained in the 1976 Act's definition
of '"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" is by its terms ap-
plicable to copyright in the design of a "useful article."99 The
latter is described in section 101 as "an article having an intrin-
sic function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information." 0 0 The substitution of "an in-
trinsic function" for "sole intrinsic function" avoids the embar-
93. 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
94. Id. at 736 (footnote omitted).
95. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
96. 414 F. Supp. 939, 940 (D.D.C. 1976).
97. Id. at 941.
98. 591 F.2d at 804.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works").
100. Id. (definition of "useful article").
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rassment caused by the prior formulation, 101 but only at the
expense of introducing new discomfort. If the Copyright Office
regulation arguably left nothing subject to the separability test,
the statutory definition may render it applicable to virtually all
three-dimensional works. Almost any sculptural work can be
put to functional uses ranging from bookends or doorstops to
paperweights or architectural elements. Unless the Delphic
reference to "intrinsic function" is shamelessly exploited, few
objects will escape this new formulation. Indeed, one court has
already held that a toy plane is a "useful article" under the 1976
Act, since children can use the plane to develop their
imagination.102
These definitional difficulties illustrate two points about
copyright in utilitarian objects. The most obvious is that useful
articles do not comprise a distinct class easily isolated from
other forms of authorship. Definitions can do little more than
focus attention on one portion of a spectrum ranging from bi-
cycles to busts of Beethoven. As a result, the issue of copyright
in utilitarian articles cannot be evaded by semantic stratagems
and even eventual passage of sui generis design legislation or
the overhaul of the existing design patent regime cannot elimi-
nate the copyright implications of aesthetically pleasing useful
objects. 03 The definitional debate also has less obvious impli-
cations. Despite the knowledge that a bust of Beethoven may
be useful in holding down papers or holding up books, an anal-
ogy to the design of baby carriages or food processors strikes
us as silly. We feel confident that the specialized legislative
machinery is inappropriate for such a work, regardless of the
difficulties inherent in formulating a less inclusive definition.
Even if the statutory description of useful articles should hap-
pen to encompass all three, we would expect the bust to sur-
vive the subsequent analysis with full copyright protection
intact. Our instincts suggest a helpful insight. We may feel
comfortable extending protection to the appearance of the bust
101. See supra text accompanying note 92.
102. Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L. Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Mich.
1981). But see Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 492 F.2d 1281,
1284 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974) (copyright upheld in model air-
plane kit). The only alternative to either an overly inclusive or overly exclusive
definition would appear to be an inquiry into an object's "primary function"--
hardly an approach calculated to increase certainty and predictability.
103. Recent design protection bills make no attempt to preempt copyright
protection for utilitarian objects. See, e.g., S. 22, tit. II, supra note 6, § 227; H.R




despite its possible usefulness in part because its form is in-
dependent of its utility. The bust is thus distinguishable, quan-
titatively if not qualitatively, from carriages or kitchen
appliances whose forms are more intimately responsive to
function. As Part I of this Article suggests, this notion of the
relative independence of form and function may provide a ra-
tional perspective on the otherwise largely irrational dictates of
the separability test. The 1976 Act obliges both the Copyright
Office and the courts to continue their efforts to distinguish ap-
plied art and industrial design. The only assistance the Act of-
fers, however, is the statement that the design of a useful
article is protectible only to the extent that it "incorporates pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified sep-
arately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article."104
Because Mazer provided the focal point for the congres-
sional analysis, it is tempting to approach the separability test
in essentially physical terms. In Mazer, the dancing figures at
issue could be physically separated from the utilitarian objects
into which they had been incorporated by the twist of a socket
and a sharp tug on an electric cord. Reliance on this simplistic
notion of physical separation, however, is misplaced. The legis-
lative history unequivocally indicates that pictorial works
adorning useful articles are entitled to copyright, yet the pat-
tern dyed into a bolt of cloth or painted on a china cup cannot
be physically detached from the object itself. In addition, some
features of utilitarian objects that can be physically separated
are clearly not intended to fall within the scope of copyright.
An ordinary television cabinet may be physically removed from
the set itself, yet protection will not be forthcoming. Physical
separability is a poor touchstone, inaccurate as a descriptive
concept,10S and devoid of normative implications. The legisla-
tive history acknowledges the necessity of a more esoteric ap-
proach, referring at one point to "some element that, physically
or conceptually, can be identified as separable."'o 6 The notion
of conceptual separability, however, can be little more than an
invitation to thoughtful analysis. It has meaning only in the
104. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works").
105. Professor Nimmer argues that even the dancing figures in Mazer could
not pass muster under a test of strict physical separability from the utilitarian
aspects of the article since the statuettes, by virtue of their use as lamp bases,
are a utilitarian feature of the object. 1 M. NmMER, supra note 83, § 2.08[B] [3].
106. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55 (emphasis added).
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context of a specific normative theory or model. Although
there has been no shortage of such models, each with its own
advantages, none appears able to discharge satisfactorily the
legislative mandate.
One possible approach to the separability criterion is to in-
terpret it as an inquiry into one's willingness to recognize the
design as art, in spite of its utilitarian properties. This ap-
proach was urged by the lighting manufacturer in Esquire.0 7
The effect of this approach, however, is to bring the analysis
full circle to the 1909 Act's "works of art" classification. 08 If
any design that might be labelled "art" is automatically treated
as conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the ob-
ject, one is left with a dilemma. If judges continue to shun
evaluations of merit or worth, the test will cease to be a mean-
ingful barrier to copyright in industrial design, a result clearly
in conflict with the legislative intent. If judges instead accede
to the role of art critics, discrimination against nonrepresenta-
tional art will become inevitable. While judges may likely rec-
ognize as art a lamp base in the form of a human figure, they
are less likely to accord similar recognition to an abstract
shape, equally unresponsive to function, particularly if it "looks
like" a lamp base. This is precisely the danger foreseen by Jus-
tice Holmes, 0 9 and echoed in Mazer" 0 and the district court
decision in Esquire."' Perhaps, as the appellate court in Es-
quire rationalized, there is less need for concern when the dis-
parate treatment results from the application of a standard that
is not itself dependent on artistic judgments," 2 but that obser-
vation offers no comfort here. Decisions on copyrightability
would rest entirely on judicial perceptions of artistic value, an
approach at odds with the legislative directive that the category
of " 'pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' carries with it no
implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic
107. "Esquire on the other hand, interprets § 202.10(c) to allow copyright re-
gistration for the overall shape or design of utilitarian articles as long as the
shape or design satisfies the requirements appurtenant to works of art--origi-
nality and creativity." 591 F.2d at 800 (footnote omitted).
108. Indeed, this was essentially the position initially adopted by the Copy-
right Office in response to the Mazer decision. Before being replaced by the
separability standard, copyright in the shape of a useful article was permitted
only "where the object is clearly a work of art in itself." 37 C.F.L § 202.10(c)
(Supp. 1956).
109. See supra note 10.
110. See supra note 10.
111. 414 F. Supp. at 941.
112. 591 F.2d at 805. The standard utilized to settle Esquire's claim barred
copyright for the "overall design or configuration" of all utilitarian objects. Id.
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quality."" 3 The approach urged by the manufacturer in Es-
quire, which would extend copyright to any design deserving of
the appellation "art," simply cannot implement the legislative
distinction between applied art and industrial design embodied
in the separability test.114
The vision of administrators or judges assessing the aes-
thetic merits of coffee pots and home computers has prompted
numerous alternative models of the separability criterion. An
aura of objectivity can be regained by transforming the judicial
role from critic to pollster, and various formulations thus have
emphasized consumer judgments. In its most expansive form,
this approach may simply focus on consumer evaluations of
aesthetic appeal, measured perhaps by success in the market-
place." 5 This approach, of course, merely taps an alternative
source of critical evaluation without overcoming the inherent
objections to conditioning legal protection on aesthetic appeal
or interest. One would hardly expect the legal status of Star
Wars or Macbeth to be determined by their showing at the box
office.
A slightly more refined approach might attempt to dispense
with the necessity of individual aesthetic appraisals by estab-
lishing general categories of commercial products for which
aesthetic appeal carries particular significance." 6 Protection
113. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 54.
114. The position of the Register of Copyrights and the District of Columbia
Circuit Court, excluding the overall shape of all utilitarian objects, however, is
equally unavailing. See infra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
115. "We see in appellant's belt buckles conceptually separable sculptural
elements, as apparently have the buckles' wearers who have used them as or-
namentation for parts of the body other than the waist." Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980). "Customers are pay-
ing fifteen dollars for it, not because it sharpens pencils uncommonly well, but
because it is also a decorative conversation piece." Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silver-
craft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (copyright upheld in pencil
sharpener simulating antique telephone). Appeals to consumer evaluations of
commercial designs are not unique to this country. "A work of craftsmanship
suggests to me a durable, useful, handmade object and a work of artistic crafts-
manship suggests something, whether of practical utility or not, which its own-
er values because of its artistic character." George Hensher Ltd. v. Restawhile
Upholstery Ltd., [1974] 2 All E.R. 420, 423.
116. See, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl,-Inc., 632 F.2d 989,- 99,
(2d Cir. 1980) ("Pieces of applied art, these buckles may be considered jewelry,
the form of which is subject to copyright protection . .. "); Esquire, Inc. v.
Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) ('The instant case concerns lighting in combi-
nation with sculpture. Here past interpretations of the existing regulations
which have allowed registration for household lamps and candlesticks give con-
tent to the copyright regulations . . . ."); 37 C.F.I § 202.10(a) (1977) (revoked
Jan. 1, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 966 (1978)) ("works of artistic craftsmanship... such
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could then be extended in a nondiscriminatory manner to all
designs in selected markets. This approach, however, is only
marginally less troublesome than direct appeal to consumer
taste. Because the marketability of almost any product is de-
pendent to some degree on its physical attractiveness, classifi-
cation would be hopelessly arbitrary.11 7 Even if limited to
products traditionally reflecting a special concern for aesthet-
ics, this model would sweep far wider than the legislative in-
tent. Purchases of automobiles, kitchen appliances, and
furniture, for example, often rest on little more than an appeal-
ing appearance, yet their designs do not generally meet the leg-
islative vision of separability.118
A narrower form of this market perspective was suggested
by Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc. 119 In that case
the plaintiff successfully obtained copyright registrations for
the design of two elaborately sculptured belt buckles. In an ac-
tion for copyright infringement, however, the district court
granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the
buckles could not satisfy the separability standard.120 The Sec-
ond Circuit disagreed:
We see in appellant's belt buckles conceptually separable sculp-
tural elements, as apparently have the buckles' wearers who have used
them as ornamentation for parts of the body other than the waist. The
primary ornamental aspect of the Vaquero and Winchester buckles is
conceptually separable from their subsidiary utilitarian function. 1 2 1
Kieselstein-Cord appears to offer the prospect of protection
whenever the ornamental aspects of the design are of "pri-
as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries"). See also Note, supra
note 6, at 1525-26; Comment, Copyright Law-Copyright Protection for Indus-
trial Designs Under the 1976 Copyrights Act" Esquire v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979), 25 WAYNE L. REV. 923, 930-31
(1979).
117. See, e.g., R. LoEwY, supra note 86, at 119 (sales increase attributed to
more attractive design for car battery).
118. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55.
119. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). Photographs of the articles are reproduced
in 632 F.2d at 995, a helpful practice all too uncommon in the case reports.
Reading both the trial and appellate opinions in Esquire, for example, is not un-
like attempting to comprehend a book on modern architecture, painting, or
sculpture without examining the illustrations.
120. 489 F. Supp. 732, 736 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). The
court held that the copyrightability of one of the buckles was determined by
the 1909 Act and accompanying regulations, while the 1976 Act was applicable
to the second of plaintiff's two designs, although it found the test for
copyrightability "to be virtually the same." 489 F. Supp. at 735. As Professor
Nimmer notes, however, although the court's decision to apply the 1909 Act to
the first buckle was correct, its justification was not. 1 M. NImAER, supra note
83, § 2.08 [B] [3] n.106.2.
121. 632 F.2d at 993.
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mary" importance to the consumer. Although this formulation
would presumably exclude the design of most common useful
objects, it too fails to provide a satisfactory approach to separa-
bility. Attempts to determine an article's "primary" attraction
to consumers will frequently prove fruitless. There is no rea-
son to expect anything approaching.unanimity on such an is-
sue, and even individual consumers generally will have mixed
motives that cannot be neatly ranked in the required hierarchy.
Does the "ornamental aspect" of an expensive sofa, for exam-
ple, become "primary," and its utilitarian function "subsidiary,"
if its owner permits no one to sit on it?122
Professor Nimmer offers a still narrower model linking
copyright to consumer appeal, suggesting that "conceptual sep-
arability exists where there is any substantial likelihood that
even if the article had no utilitarian use it would still be mar-
ketable to some significant segment of the community simply
because of its aesthetic qualities."123 Professor Nimmer ac-
knowledges, however, that his approach is not without its diffi-
culties.124  It cannot avoid the evidentiary problems that
trouble all models emphasizing consumer judgments and moti-
vations. Moreover, the difficulty with Nimmer's approach is
particularly acute, since the standard generally will require
conclusions concerning markets that do not in fact exist. The
predictive nature of the inquiry can only underscore the signifi-
cance of judicial perceptions of beauty and taste.
At a more fundamental level, it is not apparent why a will-
ingness to purchase a nonfunctional version of the design
ought to be the touchstone for protection. This standard, to-
gether with other variations on the marketability theme, is es-
sentially a measure of the success or desirability of the design.
Since the congressional decision to exclude industrial design
per se from the scope of copyright reflects a desire to ensure
vigorous competition in the marketing of commercial products,
a test that predicates protection on the appeal or success of the
design appears counterproductive. Marketability, whether or
not considered apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article,
122. See George Hensher Ltd. v. Restawhile Ltd., [1974] 2 All E. 420, 430
("I do not think that whether or not a work is to be regarded as artistic de-
pends on whether or not the primary inducement for its acquisition or reten-
tion is its functional character.").
123. 1 M. Nn.MER, supra note 83, § 2.08[B] [3]. Such an approach had been
suggested, and questioned, even before the Supreme Court's decision in Mazer.
See Note, Protecting the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility: Copyright or De-
sign Patent?, 66 HARv. L REV. 877, 882 n.33 (1953).
124. 1 M. NamEnR, supra note 83, § 2.08[B] [3].
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is irrelevant to the legislative distinction between applied art
and industrial design. The walls of numerous garages and
basements, for example, attest to the attraction of well-polished
hubcaps, yet that should not automatically remove such objects
from the realm of industrial design. 25 On the other hand,
works of applied art that are clearly copyrightable, such as
graphic designs on china or fabrics, may well be unmarketable
as pure works of art.126 Attempts to equate the statutory re-
quirement of separability with consumer assessments of merit
or value are simply incompatible with the legislative decision
to eschew aesthetic distinctions. 12 7
The case law, however, offers one approach to the separa-
bility criterion that avoids reliance on aesthetic judgments, if
only through the sheer irrationality of its distinctions. The the-
ory is most extensively articulated in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer.128
In response to the plaintiff's claim that the designs of its out-
door lighting fixtures were copyrightable works of art, the Reg-
ister of Copyrights argued that the overall shape of utilitarian
articles is never eligible for copyright. Although technically de-
cided under the 1909 statute, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia concluded that the Register's contention
accurately reflected the scope of copyright under both the 1909
and 1976 Acts. 29 Mazer was of no help to the plaintiff, the
court reasoned, because that case had dealt only with "a 'fea-
ture' segregable from the overall shape of the table lamps."130
The appeal of such an approach is obvious. It avoids the
specter of copyright in "'the whole realm of consumer products
... and industrial products' ,13 without the necessity of ap-
praising the artistic merits of their overall designs. The 1976
Act appears to offer some limited support for such an unbend-
ing approach. The definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works" refers to "features that can be identified
125. See Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int'l TeL & Tel Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 754
(N.D. Fla. 1981), affd, 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983).
126. After viewing a photograph of one of the Mazer statuettes, see R.
BROWN, KAPLAN AND BROWN'S CASES ON CoPYRIGHT 136 (1978), one might well
disagree with Professor Nimmer's conclusion that the statuette "would still be
marketable to some significant segment of the community simply because of its
aesthetic qualities," 1 M. NIa.ER, supra note 83, § 2.08 [B] [3].
127. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 54-55.
128. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
129. Id. at 803.
130. Id. at 805.
131. Id. at 801.
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separately,"132 arguably alluding to something less than the
overall shape of the useful object, even though this follows the
statement "[s ]uch works shall include works of artistic crafts-
manship insofar as theirform... are concerned."' 33
The Esquire rationale has been used to deny copyright pro-
tection to the overall shapes of numerous articles, including
hubcaps, 34 mechanical games, 35 and toy airplanes.136 It was
also cited in the district court opinion denying copyright in the
overall design of the Kieselstein-Cord belt buckles.137 The
complete excision of overall shapes suggested by Esquire, how-
ever, is difficult to reconcile with a considerable number of
cases decided under the 1909 Act, and Esquire itself concluded
that the 1976 revision merely codified existing standards.138
The overall shapes of coin banks, for example, have consist-
ently been granted protection when the prerequisites for copy-
right have been met, despite their apparent status as "useful
132. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works").
133. Id. (emphasis added). The legislative history similarly refers to "ele-
ments" that may be identified separately from the utilitarian aspects of the arti-
cle. HR. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55. The report further states that
"copyright protection would extend only to that element, and would not cover
the over-all configuration of the utilitarian article as such." Id. This, however,
appears to be merely a statement of the simple truism that when only a portion
of a work is copyrightable, the statutory protection extends to that portion
alone. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1976) (stating a similar principle for works con-
taining non-original material). If the overall shape itself is separable from the
utilitarian aspects of the work, the limitation is simply inapplicable. Indeed,
the report itself speaks of copyright in works "employed as the design of a use-
ful article." HLR. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 105.
134. See Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int'l TeL & TeL Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 754
(N.D. Fla. 1981), affd, 696 F.2d 918 (l1th Cir. 1983).
135. See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
136. See Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
Despite the court's unwavering confidence ("Clearly, without question, the de-
fendant's toy airplane is both useful and utilitarian." Id. at 625.), its conclusion
that the toy is a "useful article" is open to serious question. "A 'useful article'
is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is no? merely to portray
the appearance of the article. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (definition of "useful
article"). Whatever utility the toy may have derives entirely from the fact that
it portrays the appearance of an airplane, thus apparently falling squarely
within the statutory exception. Reference to separability and independent
existence is therefore unnecessary. See, e.g., Monogram Models, Inc. v. Indus-
tro Motive Corp., 492 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974) (copy-
right upheld in model airplane kit).
137. See Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Tel & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.
1983); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 732, 736
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
138. 591 F.2d at 803. Accord Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc,




articles." 39 The shapes of pajama bags' 40 and of molds em-
ployed in the manufacturer of ceramic figures,141 together with
ring boxes,142 and the antique telephone shape utilized for the
pencil sharpener in Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 143 have
all been accepted for registration by the Copyright Office. The
Second Circuit also repudiated the attempt to exclude the over-
all shape of useful objects from the scope of copyright in
Kieseistein-Cord, in which the court held that the overall
shapes of the plaintiffs belt buckles were copyrightable under
both the prior and present statutes. 44 A more recent case indi-
cates that the overall shape of eyeglass display cases may also
be copyrightable.145
The distinction between product features and overall shape
or design suggested in Esquire cannot be translated into a co-
herent model of the separability test. On a literal level, the
"distinction" cannot be reconciled with the definitional struc-
ture of the 1976 Act. The statutory description of a "useful arti-
cle" concludes with the statement: "An article that is normally
a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article.' "146 Ex-
139. See, e.g., Goldman-Morgan, Inc. v. Dan Brechner & Co., 411 F. Supp. 382
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Royalty Designs, Inc. v. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 204 F. Supp.
702 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). Cf. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976) (copyright in "Uncle Sam" bank in-
valid for lack of originality).
140. See R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., 444 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (stuffed toy animals used as pillows and pajama bags).
141. See S-K Potteries & Mold Co. v. Sipes, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537 (N.D.
Ind. 1976) (no judicial determination of copyright validity).
142. See Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Gresco Jewelry Co., 204 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y.),
a.fOd, 308 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1962).
143. 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The court in Esquire attempted to
distinguish Ted Arnold by arguing that the telephone casing could be physi-
cally separated from the sharpening mechanism housed within. 591 F.2d at 802
n.19. Indeed, the opinion suggests that if Esquire itself had specifically limited
its application to the housing of its lighting fixtures, excluding the base, electric
components and light bulb, a different case would have been presented. Id. at
806. The concession, however, completely undermines the overall shape ration-
ale used to justify the court's decision. The Copyright Act itself precludes pro-
tection of the "mechanical or utilitarian aspects" of "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works"). Mechanical entrails can be removed from a multitude of
consumer and industrial products, leaving cabinets or casings that would then
be entitled to copyright. If the elimination of wiring, transistors or gears is suf-
ficient to satisfy the separability test, a broad segment of industrial design will
fall within the scope of copyright. It is unlikely that the Esquire court would
actually countenance such a result.
144. 632 F.2d at 994.
145. See Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 95 (D.
Del. 1982).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (definition of "useful article").
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tending protection to even a "feature" of a utilitarian product,
such as the design of a handle or control knob or, presumably,
a lamp base, is thus by definition permitting copyright in the
overall shape of a "useful article." On a more substantive level,
the proscription against copyright in overall shapes or designs
is not an accurate reflection of the legislative intent. Congress
clearly did not wish to disturb the protection accorded the Bali-
nese dancing figures in Mazer v. Stein. 47 Assume, however,
that the plaintiffs operated a more diversified enterprise, offer-
ing in addition to their table lamps a companion cigarette
lighter in which the head of an identical figure lifts to expose
the internal mechanism. The statuette is now the overall shape
of a useful article. It seems absurd to contend that the statu-
ette is copyrightable in one context but not the other, merely
because the utilitarian aspects have been internalized.148 And
if the point is conceded for a Balinese dancer, what of a more
abstract form reflecting twentieth rather than nineteenth cen-
tury visions? The only justification for the whimsical approach
espoused in Esquire is the desire for a levee to hold back the
flood. There are, however, more discriminating barriers.
M. APPLIED ART AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGN
A. THE DESIGN PROCESS
The objective of the separability test, according to its legis-
lative history, is to divide copyrightable "applied art" from un-
copyrightable "industrial design."' 49 Rational application of the
standard thus requires some appreciation of the distinctive na-
ture of industrial design.
In a sense, the origins of industrial design can be traced to
the earliest attempts to fashion natural materials into more
useful forms. Not until the Industrial Revolution brought the
capacity to manufacture unlimited quantities of identical prod-
ucts, however, did a discreet conception of industrial design be-
gin to emerge.15 0 Initially, industrial design was little more
than a belated attempt to conceal the patent ugliness prolifer-
147. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55, 105.
148. The legislative history suggests no such distinction. See HR. REP. No.
1476, supra note 3, at 105 ("copyright ... will not be affected if the work is em-
ployed as the design of a useful article"). There is little reason to conclude that
a Mickey Mouse telephone is beyond the reach of copyright merely because the
electronics are located within Mickey's tummy.
149. M-R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55.
150. See, e.g., I. BAYNES, INDUSTRIAL DESIGN & THE COMMUNITY 10-11 (1967);
V. PAPANEK, DESIGN FOR THE REAL WORLD 22-23 (1971).
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ated by developing technologies.151 This concept of industrial
design as decoration, however, was gradually replaced by a vi-
sion premised on a more intimate relationship between the na-
ture of a product and its appearance. In 1894, Frank Lloyd
Wright declared that "the machine is here to stay," and chal-
lenged the designer to "use this normal tool of civilization to
best advantage instead of prostituting it as he has hitherto
done in reproducing with murderous ubiquity forms born of
other times and other conditions.'1 52 The twentieth century
soon saw industrial design become an integral aspect of prod-
uct development.153
The dominant feature of modern industrial design is the
merger of aesthetic and utilitarian concerns. It is the influence
of nonaesthetic factors, the nexus between what the product
must do and how it must look, that distinguishes true industrial
design from other artistic endeavors. The industrial designer
as engineer-a perspective no less valid than industrial de-
signer as artist-is subject to the functional constraints inher-
ent in each undertaking. The designer cannot follow wherever
aesthetic interests might lead. Utilitarian concerns influence,
and at times dictate, available choices. Indeed, aesthetic suc-
cess is often measured in terms of the harmony achieved be-
tween competing interests. 5 4 The merger of aesthetics and
utility defines the designer's craft, so that "[w]hatever else he
is or isn't-artist, engineer, salesman, planner, management
consultant, inventor-the industrial designer is a problem
solver."155
The most obvious factor influencing and directing the de-
signer's creativity is the necessity of accommodating the func-
tional operation of the product. At its most fundamental level,
this consideration simply excludes any form that significantly
interferes with the utility of the article. Modern approaches to
industrial design, however, generally seek a relationship be-
151. "Looking at the machine, they saw a new thing, a thing that seemed to
cry out for decorative embellishments. These decorations were usually gar-
nered from classical ornaments and from major raids into the animal and vege-
table kingdoms. Thus, giant hydraulic presses dripped with acanthus leaves,
pineapples, stylized wheat sheaves." V. PAPANI'E, supra note 150, at 23.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 23-24.
154. "All design is a compromise of conflicting requirements and the most
satisfying results are those where the priorities of the conflicting needs have
been correctly assessed.. . " F. ASHFORD, THE AESTHETICS OF ENGINEERING
DESIGN 29 (1969).




tween form and function far more intimate than simple com-
patibility. Raymond Loewy, perhaps the design profession's
most celebrated practitioner, speaks of the "natural form" and
"self-expression of the machine."' 56 The notion of form reflect-
ing function is a basic tenet of contemporary design: "The best
designs are those in which the appearance springs truly. from
the structure, and is a logical expression of it. ' 157 Perusal of
any of the multitude of books collecting illustrations of "mod-
ern" design confirms the general acceptance of this fundamen-
tal credo.158 The notion of expressing function through form
differs in an important respect from the more primitive require-
ment that form be compatible with function, since the former is
itself a purely aesthetic concern, expressing one conception of
"good" design.159 In this sense, the principle suggests limita-
tions not unlike those imposed on any artist by internal or ex-
ternal conceptions of artistic merit or worth. When practiced,
however, the principle operates to intensify the nexus between
form and function.
Other utilitarian considerations can, of course, be identi-
fied: "[T]he following things should be treated respectfully:
function, ease of operation, maintenance, cost of upkeep, stor-
age, cost of manufacturing, packing, shipping, display, safety,
fail-safe operations,.., all these and more are involved in do-
ing the job properly .. "160 Such concerns can be served
poorly or well, but they cannot be ignored. Their cumulative
influence can render the designer's task quite unlike that con-
fronting the painter or sculptor.
156. . LOEWY, supra note 86, at 13.
157. W. CAIN, ENGINEERING PRODUCT DESIGN 157 (1969). "One of the func-
tions of aesthetics in engineering design is to indicate function and purpose."
F. ASHFORD, supra note 154, at 13. "One might call the process beauty through
function and simplification." R. LOEWY, supra note 86, at 47.
158. See, e.g., K. BAYNES, supra note 150; INDUSTRIAL DESIGNERS SOCIETY OF
AMERICA, supra note 155; R. LOEWY, supra note 86; PENTAGRAM DESIGN PART-
NERSHIP, PENTAGRAM: THE WORK OF FIvE DESIGNERS (1972).
159. Other purely aesthetic considerations may, of course, be operative.
The designer may feel constrained by current trends in fashion or taste. See,
e.g., F. ASHFORD, supra note 154, at 114-16; R. LOEWY, supra note 86, at 34. Aes-
thetic options may also be limited by a desire to maintain a particular corpo-
rate design style, see F. HENRION & A. PARicN, DESIGN COORDINATION AND
CORPORATE IMAGE (1966), or to relate the appearance of components or
accessories.
160. R. LOEWY, supra note 86, at 18. See generally F. ASHFORD, supra note
154; W. CAIN, supra note 157; A. Moss, SUCCESSFUL INDUSTRIAL DESIGN (1968);
E. TJALVE, A SHORT COURSE IN INDUSTRIAL DESIGN (1979).
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B. COPYRIGr IN USEFUL ARTICLES
The legislative history describes the separability test as an
attempt "to draw as clear a line as possible between copyright-
able works of applied art and uncopyrightable works of indus-
trial design."'61 In truth, of course, there is no line, but merely
a spectrum of forms and shapes responsive in varying degrees
to utilitarian concerns. Only a model appealing directly to the
considerations underlying the separability standard can avoid
purely arbitrary distinctions.
Taking Mazer as its touchstone, Congress sought to isolate
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that are "incorporated
into a product,"' 62 or "employed as the design of a useful arti-
cle."' 63 Congress thus attempted to distinguish artistic works
that are merely utilized in the design process from those that
result from the process itself. The distinction could, of course,
be implemented by excluding all works created with some utili-
tarian application in view, but this would overturn Mazer, to-
gether with a host of other eminently sensible decisions, in
favor of an intractable factual inquiry of questionable rele-
vance. Any such categorical approach would also undermine
the legislative determination to preserve an artist's ability to
exploit utilitarian markets. 64 Alternatively, the statutory direc-
tive requires a distinction between works of industrial design
and works whose origins lie outside the design process, despite
the utilitarian environment in which they appear.
Copyrightability, therefore, should turn on the relationship be-
tween the proffered work and the process of industrial design.
Because the dominant characteristic of industrial design is the
influence of nonaesthetic, utilitarian concerns, copyrightability
ultimately should depend on the extent to which the work re-
flects artistic expression uninhibited by functional considera-
tions. Only such a direct assessment of the nature of the
claimant's contribution can implement the congressional deci-
sion to exclude the general realm of industrial design, while
preserving exclusive rights in "applied art."
Analysis of the relationship between form and function is
not new to copyright law. In an effort to avoid monopolization
of functional attributes, the law has long denied protection in
instances in which utilitarian requirements dictated a particu-
161. HR. REP. No. 1476, supra note 3, at 55.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 105.
164. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1976).
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lar form. 165 The relationship between form and function, how-
ever, is seldom so direct. Typically, a variety of forms will be
compatible with functional objectives. The choice is thus con-
strained rather than dictated.166 The separability test, devised
to exclude industrial design from the scope of copyright, sug-
gests that even this weaker relationship between form and
function is sufficient to preclude protection. The statutory cri-
terion limiting protection to "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable
of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the arti-
cle"167 should therefore be viewed as an attempt to identify ele-
ments whose form and appearance reflect the unconstrained
perspective of the artist. Such features are not the product of
industrial design; their form is not responsive to nonaesthetic
interests. They are in this sense pure art, regardless of the
context in which they appear. Two-dimensional graphic works
appearing on useful articles, for example, do not fall within the
statutory exclusion because their appearance is not affected by
functional concerns. Only artistic motives influence the choice
of flowers, birds, or geometric patterns. Similarly, the Mazer
statuettes remain copyrightable despite their use as lamp ba-
165. See, e.g., Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 911 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947); Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139
F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944). 'The Copyright Of-
fice has taken the position that calculating and measuring devices such as slide
rules, wheel dials, etc. may not claim copyright where the elements appearing
on the device (e.g., calibrations, numbers in regular progression, etc.) are nec-
essary functional expressions of the underlying mathematical principle,
formula or other 'idea.'" 1 M. NnmMER, supra note 83, § 2.08[D] [1] n.158. Simi-
larly, the Copyright Office has refused to register the patterns imprinted on in-
tegrated circuit chips because of "the danger that the desired protection could
go beyond the purpose of copyright." Hearings on H.. 1007 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (testimony of Jon Baum-
garten, General Counsel, Copyright Office), reprinted in 2 CoPYRIGrHT I REP.
(CCH) 20,029, at 10,049 (1979). The limitation is sometimes implemented by
holding that "forms of expression dictated solely by functional considerations"
do not evince the originality or creativity essential to copyright. 1 M. NmEmAP,
supra note 83, § 2.01[B]. The attempt to avoid monopolization of functional
characteristics is part of the more general attempt to preclude the extension of
copyright to "ideas." See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971); Morrissey v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
166. The distinction is explicitly drawn in recent design protection bills. Ti-
tle 11 of the revision bill, S. 22, tit. II, supra note 6, would have afforded protec-
tion to an "original ornamental design of a useful article," id. § 201, but
excluded "a design that is ... dictated solely by a utilization function of the
article that embodies it," id. § 202.




ses, because their form is not responsive to utilitarian de-
mands. Although created specifically for use in lamps, their
form reflects purely aesthetic visions.168
The notion of distinguishing applied art from industrial de-
sign by examining the extent to which utilitarian considera-
tions influence artistic expression has rarely surfaced in the
case law. A few decisions make passing reference to similar
ideas, 69 but the approach has never been used as a general
model of the separability criterion. Yet no other model appears
capable of successfully implementing the legislative decision to
maintain unrestrained competition in the marketing of useful
articles, subject only to an artist's exclusive rights in "incorpo-
rated" art.
A model emphasizing the influence of utilitarian factors
frees the judicial analysis from its unfortunate fixation on ap-
pearance alone. If the ultimate aim is to distinguish applied art
from industrial design, theories focusing only on appearances
cannot achieve the desired end. It is the process more than the
result that gives industrial design its distinctive character. Al-
though the shape of an old-fashioned telephone, for example,
would likely be excluded from copyright under any of the alter-
native interpretations of the separability test, what of the de-
sign of a pencil sharpener fashioned to present a similar
appearance? The decision in Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft
Co.17 0 to protect such a work may well be correct. Although
168. This is not to say that whenever "the appearance of an article is deter-
mined by esthetic (as opposed to functional) considerations," H.R. REP. No.
1476, supra note 3, at 55, it is therefore copyrightable. Such a standard would
permit protection for virtually the whole of industrial design, in clear contra-
vention of the legislative intent. It is the fact that the form of the Mazer statu-
ettes is independent of their function, and thus unrelated to their utility, that
"separates" it from the utilitarian aspects of the lamp.
169. In the case of costume jewelry, while the overall form is to some
extent pre-determined by the use for which it is intended, the creator
is free to express his idea of beauty in many ways. Unlike an automo-
bile, a refrigerator or a gas range the design of a necklace or of a brace-
let, may take as many forms as the ingenuity of the artist may
conceive.
Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551, 553 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (copyright upheld in costume jewelry). "Plaintiff concedes that the
dimensions it designed were limited by the dimensions of the pencil sharpener.
But this does not mean that the antique telephone is merely utilitarian. There
was still room here for considerable artistic expression." Ted Arnold Ltd. v.
Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 735-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (copyright upheld in
pencil sharpener casing). "The shapes of the toys and their dimensions and
configurations also appear to have been dictated primarily by utilitarian consid-
erations." Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 915 (2d Cir. 1980)
(denying copyright in "sculpture" of mechanical games).
170. 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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the appearance of the two products is similar, the creative pro-
cess is not. In the context of a pencil sharpener, the form rep-
resents an essentially arbitrary conception responsive only to
aesthetics.171
The perspective afforded by this suggested approach to the
separability standard may explain the superficial appeal of
many competing models. In some instances, for example, phys-
ical separability may underscore the unconstrained, artistic na-
ture of a particular product feature. The ability to remove a
hood ornament without affecting an automobile's performance
evidences its purely aesthetic origins. Art equally divorced
from utilitarian influence, however, may often escape such nar-
row vision. Two-dimensional graphic works are not in reality
171. Emphasis on the creative process has long been part of copyright law,
particularly with respect to objects claiming protection by virtue of their status
as "works of art" (now "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"). "It is not
necessarily a 'work of art,' something displaying artistic merit, but it is 'objet
d'art'--something upon which the labors of an artist as such have been em-
ployed." Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 611 (E.D. Pa. 1924).
The current Copyright Office regulations require that "to be acceptable as a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, the work must embody some creative au-
thorship in its delineation or form." 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1981). Although the
process of industrial design is surely "creative" in a colloquial sense, the influ-
ence of nonaesthetic, functional considerations undermines the unfettered ar-
tistic creativity traditionally recognized by copyright. 'That degree of
creativity necessary to define objects as works of art is not supplied through
innovations which are solely utilitarian or mechanical." Gardenia Flowers, Inc.
v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). "Illustrative of
the requirement of minimal creativity are those cases which deny copyright
protection to ... forms of expression dictated solely by functional considera-
tions." 1 M. NmnMER, supra note 83, § 2.01 [B] (footnotes omitted). The signifi-
cance of artistic freedom in the creative process was recently emphasized in
connection with a legislative attempt to include within the scope of copyright
the patterns imprinted on integrated circuit chips.
The subcommittee should assure itself that-within the constraints of
chip purpose and size-the designer's choice of a particular layout, and
the representation of the designer's labors in the "photographic masks"
and "imprinted patterns", is not dictated by the function to be per-
formed by the chip and does represent a creative choice from among
different possibilities. This standard is implicit in our assumption that
the works to be protected are the result of "authorship."
Hearings on H.R. 1007 Before the Subcomm. on Court, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (testimony of Jon Baumgarten, General Counsel, Copyright Of-
fice), reprinted in 2 CoPYRIG T L. REP. (CCH) 20,029, at 10,049 (1979). Al-
though the outcome of the industrial design process may not be dictated by
function, one could argue that the influence of nonaesthetic concerns does in-
deed undermine the artistic creativity that marks the work of the sculptor or
painter. The requirement of creativity may thus lend further support to a dis-
tinction between those shapes and configurations that are responsive to func-




physically detachable from the objects on which they appear.
Three-dimensional shapes, whether coin banks,172 pajama
bags,173 jewelry,174 or pencil sharpeners 7 5 may also represent
essentially arbitrary artistic conceptions, despite the absence of
physical separability. Similarly, since utilitarian factors will
significantly influence the overall shape of most useful arti-
cles,176 a general rule of exclusion such as that expounded in
Esquire is not without justification, yet it too sweeps too
broadly. 77 Such draconian models can at best only approxi-
mate the distinctions pursued in the revision effort. Only direct
reference to the legislative conceptions of "applied art" and "in-
dustrial design" embodied in the separability test can produce
more discriminating results.
Emphasis on artistic independence has the additional ad-
vantage of neutralizing the arbitrary nature of the "useful arti-
cle" characterization. The statutory category comprising
articles "having an intrinsic uilitarian function" may yield too
rich a harvest, 7 8 but works at the margin will generally survive
inspection in any event. When utility is peripheral, as in paper-
weights or bookends, form is generally not significantly con-
strained by function, and thus the work will retain protection
regardless of its characterization.
Attention to functional influences on form and appearance
may also alleviate the de facto discrimination against
nonrepresentational art that has regrettably accompanied
much of the current analysis. It is difficult to quarrel with
172. See, e.g., Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner & Co., Inc., 411 F.
Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Royalty Designs, Inc. v. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 204
F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
173. See R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., 444 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D.N.Y.
1978).
174. See, e.g., Boucher v. DuBoyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 936 (1958); Cynthia Designs, Inc. v. Robert Zentall, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 510
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. B. Steinberg-Kaslo Co., 144
F. Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134
F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
175. See Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
176. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d Cir.
1980) (shape of mechanical games not copyrightable); Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579
F.2d 294,.297 (4th Cir. 1978) (typeface designs not copyrightable); Norris Indus.
Corp. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 754, 755-56 (N.D. Fla. 1981),
affd, 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983) (hubcaps not copyrightable); SCOA Indus.,
Inc. v. Famolare, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 216, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (shoe sole
not copyrightable). Cf. Jack Odelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F.
Supp. 187, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (copyright in drawing of dress gives no mo-
nopoly over the manufacture of the garment itself).
177. See supra notes 128-48 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
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Judge Gesell's observation in Esquire that copyrightability
ought not depend on adherence to particular artistic visions or
styles. 7 9 There is no justification for limiting copyright to
works reflecting aesthetic regimes in which the standard of
merit is resemblance to external objects, while excluding those
which seek virtue in the relationship. of forms within the work
itself. Yet, since the ordinary observer can more easily recog-
nize a representational work that has been incorporated into a
utilitarian object, emphasis on physical separability will fre-
quently cause more abstract forms to be either overlooked or
thought too "integrated" to satisfy the statutory requirement.180
The general exclusion of overall shapes has a similarly perni-
cious effect. To avoid a crass or tasteless appearance, a utilita-
rian article is more likely to be given an abstract rather than
representational form, although either may be arbitrary with
respect to the underlying utility.'18 Thus a ban on copyright in
overall shape will fall heavily on abstract forms, barring works
whose origins may lie far from the practical influences of the
design process. The discrimination is diminished, however,
under a model that places direct emphasis on the relationship
between form and function. The shape of a Mickey Mouse tele-
phone is copyrightable because its form is independent of func-
tion. A telephone shape owing more to Arp, Brancusi, or Moore
than Disney may be equally divorced from utilitarian influence.
An abstract shape employed as a lamp base may embody an ar-
tistic conception as untainted by utilitarian concerns as the Ma-
zer statuettes.182  In all instances, unless the legislative
distinction between applied art and industrial design is ig-
nored, copyrightability must turn on the extent to which the
179. 414 F. Supp. at 941.
180. The result does deny protection to designers who use modem
three-dimensional abstract works artfully incorporated into a func-
tional object as an inseparable aspect of the article while granting it to
those who attach their independent representational art, or even their
trite gimmickry, to a useful object for purposes of enhancement.
... It is the originator's success in completely integrating the ar-
tistic designs and the functional aspects of the buckles that preclude
copyright.
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Weinstein, J., dissenting from decision to uphold copyright in belt buckles).
181. '"We may concede, for present purposes, that an interpretation of
§ 202.10(c) that bars copyright for the overall design or configuration of a utilita-
rian object will have a disproportionate impact on designs that exhibit the char-
acteristics of abstract sculpture." Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 805 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
182. Cf. L & L White Metal Casting Corp. v. Joseph, 387 F. Supp. 1349, 1354
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (infringement of lamp base castings).
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work reflects either the independent perspective of the artist or
the more integrated approach of the designer.
A model requiring assessments of artistic independence
and utilitarian influence cannot offer the neat divisions prom-
ised by many of the alternative formulations. The distinctions
drawn by current analysis, however, often prove illusory, or are
maintained at too great a cost. The concepts of "applied art"
and "industrial design" communicate the simple truth that
some forms are more responsive to utility, and thus less the
product of untrammeled aesthetic visions, than others. No
mechanical test appears capable of capturing that relationship
over a significant portion of the spectrum. Difficult judgments
cannot be avoided, and only artificial divisions can succeed in
making easy work of cases such as Esquire or Kieselstein-
Cord.183
IV. CONCLUSIONS
When copyright in "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works" ventures beyond the narrow confines of the "fine arts,"
the slope becomes slippery indeed. Current law expressly pre-
serves exclusive rights in works of art applied to utilitarian
ends, yet wisely endeavors to exclude the general design of
commercial products. The distinction between copyrightable
"applied art" and uncopyrightable "industrial design" has gen-
erally been pursued through mechanical models offering the
seductive security of unbending rules and ostensibly objective
183. In Esquire, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia declined
to venture beyond mechanical formulas. There was no attempt to assess the
nature of the plaintiffs contribution. If its lighting fixtures had assumed the
appearance of giant Balinese dancers, one can presume the court would have
duly noted their conceptual independence. That the plaintiff chose a less hor-
rific form does not exclude the possibility of a similarly untainted artistic con-
ception. The task of judging the extent to which Esquire's forms reflect
aesthetic decisions unrelated to function may be an unenviable one, but the
legislative distinction between applied art and industrial design requires it. If
the Esquire decision is correct, the credit is to chance rather than reason.
The Second Circuit's examination of Kieselstein-Cord's belt buckles is
more promising. Although unable to articulate a coherent rationale for its con-
clusion that the sculptural designs were conceptually separable from the utili-
tarian aspects of the works, the court did not retreat to stock alternatives. Its
intuition, and that of the Copyright Office which granted registration, appears
well founded. Although clearly constrained in some respects by functional ne-
cessities, the buckles' overall shapes appear largely devoid of utilitarian influ-
ence, reflecting instead the purely aesthetic judgments of their creator. See,
e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 95 F.D. 95 (D. Del.
1982) (expressing willingness to inquire into the conceptual separability of the
shape of eyeglass display cases).
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criteria. The arbitrary divisions inevitably engendered by tradi-
tional analysis, however, can only crudely approximate the dis-
tinctions pursued in the revision effort.
The Copyright Act of 1976 invites a more discriminating
analysis. The standard of separate identity and independent
existence encourages a thoughtful appraisal of the character of
the claimant's contribution. The exclusion of industrial design
from the scope of copyright is best understood as an attempt to
bar forms influenced in significant measure by utilitarian con-
cerns. Thus, copyright is reserved to product features and
shapes that reflect even in their utilitarian environment the un-
constrained aesthetic perspective of the artist. Nothing short of
a candid assessment of the nature of the proffered work can
successfully implement the prudent, yet fragile, distinction be-
tween applied art and industrial design.
